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ABSTRACT
Rationale/Purpose: More than a year into the pandemic, scholars and
practitioners have highlighted several of the organizational implications of
coronavirus-disease 2019 (COVID-19) on worldwide cultural festivals and
sporting events. Following COVID-19, numerous major sporting events,
including the 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympics, were postponed in February
and March 2020. As the new dates of many rescheduled sporting events
approach in time, the article discusses pressing questions related to sporting
event risk, safety and security.
Design/Methodology/Approach: The paper is conceptual and employs
insights and frames from the risk management literature for its examination
of sporting events staged in the mid- and late 2020 and early 2021.
Findings: We analyse risk management strategies and safety practices at
recent sporting events that have been staged throughout the pandemic. Our
argument is that the rescheduled sporting events – exemplified by the 2020
Olympics – have been subject to organizational, social and spatial redesign
processes.
Practical Implications: The paper can provide emerging lessons and
considerations for sporting event stakeholders in the face of the COVID-19
pandemic.
Research Contributions: The paper adds to our understanding of emerging
risk management strategies and safety practices that event stakeholders
have adopted in the context of COVID-19. This is supplemented by an
emerging and multidisciplinary research agenda.
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Introduction
On 24 March 2020, the 2020 Tokyo Summer
Olympics and Paralympics were postponed by
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in
light of the rapidly unfolding COVID-19 pan-
demic.1 The decision, which saw the event
pushed back for one year (to 23 July-8 August
2021, and to 24 August-5 September for the
Paralympics), meant that the Olympics followed
the path of several other sports mega-events
that were either postponed or cancelled in
the face of the global health crisis (Parnell et
al., 2020). Whilst every Olympic edition, and
sport mega-events more generally, are sur-
rounded by risk and uncertainty (Boyle & Hagg-
erty, 2012), the upcoming 2020 Olympics,
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fundamentally, initiate a series of critical ques-
tions in the current time.
Firstly, it remains uncertain whether the
pandemic will be under control by July 2021.
In February 2021, Tokyo and nine other areas
in Japan were in a coronavirus state of emer-
gency (The Independent, 2021a), and per 3
March 2021, 433,504 COVID-19 cases and
7933 deaths had been recorded in Japan.2
Further, it has been reported that 80 percent
of Tokyo’s residents feel the Games should
not be staged in 2021 (The Independent,
2021b). There was also opposition amongst
the host country’s residents against the idea
of allowing international spectators to attend
(Reuters, 2021). Then, on 20 March 2021, the
organizing committee confirmed that inter-
national spectators would not be able to
attend the rescheduled Olympics. In spite of
this, as Shimizu et al. (2021, p. 1) write, “there
has been a lack of transparency about the
benefits and risk, and international mass gath-
ering events such as Tokyo 2020 are still
neither safe nor secure”. Secondly, and
despite the absence of overseas spectators, it
still remains unclear if crowds of spectators
will be present in the mega-event spaces by
July 2021. As McCurry (2021) writes, “[i]deas
being floated by the IOC and organizers range
from allowing full stadiums, cutting venue
capacities by half and banning spectators”.
Yet, reports suggest Japan may limit spectators
to 50% of the stadium capacity, with Masa
Takaya, a spokesman for the Tokyo Olympic
organizing committee, saying a decision will
be made in April (White, 2021). Quite similar
questions may also be asked in relation to
other rescheduled sporting events. And more
broadly, the pandemic can represent a turning
point with regards to sport mega-events organ-
ization and especially safety and security man-
agement (Lee Ludvigsen & Hayton, 2020).
In a way, this was demonstrated by the series
of Playbooks published by the IOC, the
International Paralympic Committee (IPC) and
the Tokyo 2020 Organising Committee (Tokyo
2021) in February 2021. The Playbook docu-
ments contain guidelines and a “game plan”
for how Olympic athletes and stakeholders
can play their part in the “safe and successful”
(IOC, 2021a) Olympic delivery. Moreover, the
G7 leaders expressed their support for Japan’s
commitment to stage the Games “in a safe
and secure manner […] as a symbol of global
unity in overcoming COVID-19” (G7, 2021).
Both inside and outside of the sports world,
pressing questions related to sports mega-
events’ risk, safety and security figure promi-
nently (Ranney, 2021).
Building upon the recent academic attention
given to the 2020 Olympics (Boykoff, 2020;
Boykoff & Gaffney, 2020; Constandt & Willem,
2021; Hutchins & Andrejevcic, 2021; Rookwood
& Adeosun, 2021; Shimizu et al., 2021), this
paper provides an analysis of recent sports
events and competition that have been
staged throughout the pandemic in mid- and
late 2020 and early 2021, ahead of the 2020
Olympics and several other international sport-
ing events. The article aims to identify and
discuss risk management strategies and indus-
try practices in an epoch of “covid-secure”
sporting events, which can impact the planning
and eventual delivery of the Olympics and
other sport mega-events. Sporting events, we
argue, have undergone redesigns which this
article maps the contours of.
The article begins with a discussion of risk
management and risk strategies at contempor-
ary sports events. Then, we examine a number
of recent sporting events or competitions
hosted throughout the pandemic, between
June 2020 and the present-day. We then
discuss the mentioned Playbooks and the
Olympic test events, as two specific pre-event
risk management strategies. The paper will con-
clude by highlighting some implications and
considerations for future research.
2See: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/.
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Risk management and risk strategies
For Chang and Singh (1990), sports events are
surrounded by a complex set of risks that
present major concerns for event organizers
and stakeholders. Accordingly, risk manage-
ment processes must begin “long before the
event actually takes place” (p. 52), whilst the
selected risk management strategies can rep-
resent “the key to a successful event”
(Leopkey & Parent, 2009b, p. 154). Crucially,
the centrality of risk management at inter-
national sporting events has increased in line
with broader trends, including sports’ growing
popularity and increased media coverage,
insurance costs and terrorist threats (Brynildsen
& Parent, 2021). While different definitions exist,
we define risk management here as a “proactive
process that involves assessing all possible risk
to the event and its stakeholders by strategi-
cally anticipating, preventing, minimizing, and
planning responses to mitigate those identified
risks” (Leopkey & Parent, 2009a, p. 205).
Over the last decades, and after 9/11 in par-
ticular, the body of research exploring safety
and security risks at sport mega-events has
extended considerably (Boyle & Haggerty,
2012; Cleland, 2019; Giulianotti & Klauser,
2010; Lee Ludvigsen, 2020; Toohey & Taylor,
2008). Especially as precautionary principles,
increasingly, have guided sporting event risk
managers (see Toohey & Taylor, 2008). While
safety and security have featured centrally in
the extant literature as important aspects of
any sport event’s risk management, Jennings
(2012) and Leopkey and Parent (2009b) also
draw attention to the importance of a broad
approach to any unforeseen sporting event
risk categories (these could relate to e.g.
financing, human resources, sports or positive/
negative media stories). To mitigate these risk
categories, risk management requires the adap-
tion of specific strategies or tactics.
By drawing from the pre-existing literature
and their own empirical findings from two
Canadian sporting events (the 2006 Figure
Skating Championship and the 2007 FIFA U-20
World Cup), Leopkey and Parent (2009b)
provide a strategic framework with seven risk
strategy categories. From an event host stake-
holder perspective, these are relevant when
dealing with the various risk management cat-
egories. Essentially, the distinctive categories
that are identified are: (1) reduction, (2) avoid-
ance, (3) reallocation, (4) diffusion, (5) prevention,
(6) legal and (7) relationships (p. 162). Within this
framework, reduction – composing a broad cat-
egory – is accordingly the most commonly
deployed strategy.
Reduction refers to diminishing or lessening
risks and involves planning, clear organizational
goals, staffing, controlling, communication and
test events (p. 162). Indeed, Brynildsen and
Parent’s (2021) recent study of Winter Olympic
test events demonstrates the ability of test
events as reduction tactics which can give sta-
keholders “hands-on” experience. Moreover,
the remaining six categories can be succinctly
summarized as follows: “avoidance (staying
away from risk), re-allocation (transferring of
risk to other parties), diffusion (separation or
dispersion of risk), prevention (elimination of
risk), legal (insurance against risk), and relation-
ships (cooperation and balancing risk)”
(Leopkey & Parent, 2009b, p. 166). Apart from
the mentioned reduction strategies, the most
frequently utilized strategies were relation-
ships, legal and avoidance, it is found (ibid.).
This framework of risk strategies has been
applied to other mega-events. From the per-
spective of a participating team, Hanstad
(2012) explores how Norway’s national team
identified risk management issues and
handled risk strategies prior and throughout
the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver,
Canada. Hanstad, in particular, documents the
relevance of reduction, avoidance, diffusion
and relationships as risk strategy categories.
Yet, this concurrently demonstrates the flexi-
bility of the relevant framework, as it may be
applied to the perspectives of both event
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hosts and participating teams, both of which
must adapt respective strategies.
Importantly, however, Leopkey and Parent
(2009b) highlight that new event locations,
and their unique political and economic
environments may impact the adopted risk
strategies. The importance of a sports event’s
particular context, ultimately, connects with
Giulianotti and Klauser (2010) who argue that
existing risk theories can be applied to explore:
[H]ow specific security risks and “risk groups”
are identified by relevant stakeholders at
different SMEs [sport mega-events]; how
security institutions (both public and private)
implement specific risk-management tech-
niques within particular contexts; and how
risk legacies remain in post-SME contexts
(p. 57)
Evidently, the particular contexts of a sports
event are likely to impact their overarching
risk management processes. Indeed, it has
been suggested that the pandemic represents
a “live test” which pushes organizations to
readjust their approaches to and plans for
risk and readiness (Parent & Reutsch, 2021).
In this sense, the 2020 Olympics and the
event’s scale constitutes a setting in which
the mentioned strategies related to risk man-
agement, including reduction, relationship
and avoidance strategies, must be developed
on-the-job, through the recirculation of
recent lessons and practices and in relation
to the transmission and case rate realities.
Moreover, this current situation provides a
unique context and we thereby set out to
discuss how the current health catastrophe of
COVID-19 has impacted the strategies and
tools of risk and security management at sport-
ing events. To do this, we explore some of the
sports events staged throughout the pandemic
in mid- and late 2020 and early 2021. The pan-
demic remains on-going, and its impacts on
the world (and the sports world) have been
unprecedented (Parnell et al., 2020). As such,
there is still a need to understand the emer-
ging strategies that may be used by organizers
and stakeholders in order to mitigate COVID-
19 related risks and threats at present-day
sports events. This remains particularly impor-
tant as numerous rescheduled sport mega-
events approach in time, including but not
limited to the 2020 Olympics, UEFA Euro
2020, Copa America and the 2021 Wimbledon
Championships. Ultimately, the discussed
frames and insights from the reviewed litera-
ture can therefore be revisited and evaluated
in this exceptional time and sporting event
environments.
Looking back
Sports events are normally visited by mass
crowds that gather inside confined crowded
spaces. Faced with the risk of an infectious
disease like COVID-19, sports events can thus,
at a basic level, have super-spreader potential,
and become sites where diseases might
spread among a broad variety of people
(Dickman, 2013). Strategies to reduce the risks,
in light of COVID-19 catastrophe, were
implemented. These included cancelling
events with super-spreader potential, enforcing
social distancing, reducing travel, quarantine,
and clear communication from governments
(as identified by Ebrahim et al., 2020), all of
which were intended to delay the spread of
the outbreak until a vaccine became available.
During this period, we have witnessed sports
events return from a temporary suspension
from May 2020 and onwards behind “closed
doors” or with limited crowds inside the
venues (Perić et al., 2021; Rookwood &
Adeosun, 2021). Given the need to reduce the
risk of mass gatherings, notably through
crowd density, it is no surprise activities
began behind closed doors without spectators
(Ebrahim & Memish, 2020).
Notwithstanding, the resumption of sporting
events with or without crowds has not proved
entirely straight-forward. A series of new risk
strategies have been adopted by event organi-
zers and sporting bodies, in order to provide
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safety for the relevant events’ athletes, specta-
tors and stakeholders. Here, one noticeable
risk reduction strategy can be seen in the
cases of the 2019/20 National Basketball
League (NBA) and UEFA Champions League
(UCL). The NBA and the UCL both resumed in
late-July and August 2020 – and were com-
pleted – inside sealed-off “bubbles”.
For instance, the NBA “bubble”, an isolation
zone inside the Disney World in Orlando –
hosted 22 teams that were provided with
accommodation, training facilities, security
and testing (Reuters, 2020). This again suggests
that specific strategies related to accreditation,
facility management and controlling (Leopkey
& Parent, 2009b) were adopted. The NBA
games, meanwhile, were staged at the ESPN
Wide World of Sports Complex inside the
“bubble”. Whereas the cost of resuming the
NBA season inside the “bubble” came to an esti-
mated $150 million, the resumption still saved
the league from losing out on larger TV reven-
ues (Hindman et al., 2021). Reportedly, athletes,
staff and media were regularly tested for
COVID-19 and, in the case of a positive result,
individuals would be placed in 14-day isolation
inside the Orlando campus (The Guardian,
2020). Similar to the Olympic Playbooks, ath-
letes were also provided a document with
guidelines for their stay in the NBA “bubble”
(ESPN, 2020). Some evidence suggests that
the “bubble”, with its rigorous testing pro-
gramme, was effective in preventing virus
spread. For example, the NBA could report of
three consecutive weeks without positive tests
(Forbes, 2020). The NBA staged 172 games suc-
cessfully inside the Disney campus. Reflecting
on the organization and logistics of the
bubble, Kelly Flatow (NBA Executive Vice Presi-
dent of Global Events) highlighted the impor-
tance of collaborative efforts and the
continual revision of health and safety proto-
cols in the face of a new challenge. Flatow
stated that:
The most important part of pulling everything
together was the collaboration […] With every
event and program we do around the world, it
is a cross-functional effort, but in this case, it
was hyper-sensitive collaboration in terms of
making sure we looked at it from every
angle. We had so many logistical challenges
that we had never faced before from a
health and safety perspective (quoted in USA
Today, 2020)
Yet, rigorous testing regimes and collaboration
represent no panacea nor guarantee for “covid-
secure” sports events and their athletes, visitors,
staff or stakeholders. In December 2020, several
English Premier League games were postponed
following coronavirus outbreaks in different
clubs (BBC Sport, 2020). Further, whilst the
2021 World’s Men Handball Championship in
Egypt (in four host cities) was completed
behind closed doors, Cape Verde’s team were
forced to withdraw following a virus outbreak
in their squad (BBC Sport, 2021a). Weeks later,
for the 2021 Australian Open at Melbourne
Park (8-21 February), more than 500 athletes,
staff and officials had to self-isolate following
a positive case in one of the tournament’s quar-
antine hotels. Subsequently, this led to the
postponement of a tournament warm-up
match (Sky Sports, 2021a). For the Australian
Open, athletes were also required to comply
with a 14-day quarantine policy upon arrival
in Australia (ibid.). These early indications
demonstrate how outbreaks have disrupted
athletes and the event organization, although
the mentioned events or competitions have
been completed.3
In the current unpredictable climate, ques-
tions also exist around the prospects of a pres-
ence of spectators at events like the Olympics
and UEFA Euro 2020. Previous research into
the safety and security perceptions of mega-
event attendees, mostly in relation to potential
terrorist threats, show that some potential visi-
tors may be deterred from attending due to
safety concerns (Taylor & Toohey, 2006). Event
3With the exception of the 2020/21 Premier League (still on-going at the time of writing).
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visitors’ safety concerns are important when
making the decision on whether to attend or
not, and concerns can impact visitors’ overall
event experiences (Toohey & Taylor, 2008). Sim-
ultaneously, sports event attendance may be
used to display a “resilience to fear and
anxiety” (ibid., p. 464). Presently, little is
known about how sports event visitors’
responses to the new threat of COVID-19.
However, interestingly, Perić et al. (2021) find
in a survey that sporting event consumers in
Croatia, Iran and Slovenia expressed a desire
to attend sporting events when movement
restrictions are lifted gradually. These findings
also underline the centrality of safety-related
protective measures at future events.
Indeed, some sporting events and compe-
titions have returned with crowds. This includes
the English Premier League (with up to 4000
attendees), the FIFA Club World Cup in Qatar
(30 percent of the stadium capacities), and the
US Super Bowl LV (with 25,000 attendees in a
65,000-capacity stadium). The Super Bowl “is
the most-watched single-game sporting event
in the US” (Schimmel, 2011, p. 3278), and for
Super Bowl LV on 7 February 2021, the safety
protocols included face coverings, physical dis-
tancing, temperature checks and PPE for staff
(The Guardian, 2021a). Meanwhile, 7500 tickets
were assigned to vaccinated health-care
workers (NFL, 2021). As National Football
League (NFL) spokesperson, Brian McCarthy,
commended in relation to these safety
procedures:
We took a critical look at all of our functions to
ensure a safe and responsible gameday experi-
ence for fans […] And that begins with the
parking lots where fans may get there four
or five hours prior to [the game] […] We
spent a lot of time with local, county, state,
and federal officials, medical experts, and
public health experts to go over our plans,
and they provided feedback (quoted in The
Guardian, 2021a).
As comes to fore in the above statement, the
safety planning ahead of Super Bowl LV thus
involved a series of pro-active processes and
assessments (see Leopkey & Parent, 2009a).
Spatially, it would encompass places outside
the stadium where fans would interact and
move in the build-up to the main event. Fur-
thermore, the pre-planning, as apparent,
involved consultative processes (see Swart &
Maralack, 2020) of information and knowledge
sharing between a diverse set of stakeholders
which, seemingly, formed a pre-game relation-
ships strategy involving cooperation, nego-
tiation and meeting stakeholder needs
(Leopkey & Parent, 2009a).
Meanwhile, the mentioned Australian Open
was visited by 17,922 spectators on the tourna-
ment’s first day (BBC Sport, 2021b). However,
due to an enforced five-day lockdown in host
city Melbourne, following a smaller outbreak,
spectators were prevented from attending the
tournament for the period between 13 and 17
February (Sky Sports, 2021b) as the competition
continued behind closed doors. Spectators then
returned, at reduced numbers, for the Australian
Open’s final four days (ibid.). This development
subsequently marked an important shift: ulti-
mately, the tennis tournament was approached
as a workplace – rather than an entertainment
event/venue, which allowed the event’s sport-
ing side to continue in the absence of fans. As
the premier of Victoria, Daniel Andrews, stated:
Large and small professional sport events, they
will function essentially as a workplace… But
they will not function as an entertainment
event, because there will be no crowds. And
the workforce will be the minimum that is
needed in order for that to be Covid-safe
and safe in lots of other contexts (quoted in
The Guardian, 2021b).
Essentially, the case of the Australian Open
demonstrates the organizational disruptions
and challenges that may emerge throughout
an event’s duration in the pandemic context.
Further, it also shows how processes of learning
occur when planning for, organizing and
staging “covid-secure” sporting events.
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Important insight into this is provided by the
Tournament Director and Tennis Australia
CEO, Craig Tiley, who commented in light of
the five-day lockdown that: “We have been on
a massive learning curve; this is not the same
model for everyone or tempered for everyone,
but this one has worked and I think it can be
applied in many cases” (quoted in Sky Sports,
2021c). Tiley also stated that:
One thing I have learned is that it’s extremely
difficult to pull off an event of this nature
with these number of international players
coming from around the world, all the hot-
spots in the world, particularly as we still
are at the height of this pandemic […] As
far as the IOC goes, we’ve shared information
with the Australian Olympic Committee and
with a few people in the IOC and I’m sure
we would be happy to share more. (quoted
in Sky Sports, 2021c)
From the above reflections, we observe that the
event organizers’ lessons and experiences from
staging the Australian Open were shared
through networks of information. Such lessons
may be recirculated and inform forthcoming
events, although the nature and profile of each
event differ and may complicate this (“this not
the same model for everyone”). Whilst the for-
mation of globalized networks of expertise has
become common practice ahead of contempor-
ary sport mega-events (Giulianotti & Klauser,
2011), the uniqueness of the Covid-crisis requires
that stakeholders search for new sets of rec-
ommended and good practices that derive
from a relatively limited set of staged events
throughout mid- to late 2020 and early 2020.
At sporting events where crowds have returned
in limited numbers (see selected examples in
Table 1), safety and security measures have
involved, for example, socially distanced
seating, face masks, one-way entrances and
exits, temperate checks, some clubs (i.e.
Everton FC) required spectators to provide a
negative COVID-19 test result prior to attending
(Kirkbride, 2020) and technologies that assist
issues related to over-crowding or social distan-
cing, and temperature checks. Indeed, for Hutch-
ins and Andrejevcic (2021), new technologies are
also likely to impact the 2020 Olympics as public
health measures may blend with security-related
and consumption technologies. As they argue:
The challenge posed by the circulation of
people under pandemic conditions is not just
to facilitate and accelerate movement, but to
simultaneously minimize the forms of social
contact that enable viral spread. The emerging
goal is transactional “touchlessness,” com-
bined with automated monitoring of personal
contacts (ibid., p. 375)
New strategies and systems – and naturally,
these systems’ aims and rationales (e.g. distan-
cing, “touchlessness”, track/trace) – serve to
demonstrate how sporting event risk manage-
ment, for now, has come to revolve primarily
around limiting, mapping andmonitoring phys-
ical and social contact between individuals and
crowds. Despite this, however, other risk cat-
egories will still exist. The new strategies are
also demonstrated by this discussion overall,
Table 1. Selected sports events staged between January–March 2021.
Sports Event or Competition Date(s) Place Sport(s) Attendance




UK Football Closed doors, and periods with 2000–4000
spectators.
2021 World Men’s Handball
Championship
13–31 January 2021 Egypt Handball Closed doors
2020 FIFA Club World Cup 4–11 February 2021 Qatar Football 30 percent of the stadium capacities
Super Bowl LV 7 February 2021 USA American
Football
25,000 (in a 65,000 stadium)






Germany Nordic skiing Closed doors
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as it is observable how a range of new practices,
strategies and issues emerge in the response to
COVID-19. Importantly, some of these strategies
are likely to be adapted or appear in some form
in the 2020 Olympics. However, it also remains
crucial to highlight that the size and scale of the
Olympics naturally complicate the prospects of
“policy-transfer” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000) of
existing knowledge-based templates or policies
that commonly inform or assist the Olympic
planning and delivery (Coaffee, 2013).
The International Judo Federation (IJF),
initially suspended The World Judo Tour in
March 2020 and did not return until August
2020. Yet, it had to call time on the tour
season, where 400 competitors from 61
countries convened on Hungary, less than a
month after it returned. IJF President Marius
Vizer said it was a “hard decision to take” but
stressed the safety of athletes was the top pri-
ority as the world continues to grapple with
the coronavirus pandemic (Berkeley, 2020,
p. 1). Ultimately, the Olympics represent a
multi-sports events which is staged across
various venues, stadiums and sport centres.
The nature of the deployed arenas also differs
between being outdoors (i.e. golf, sailing)
and indoors (i.e. basketball, handball). It also
involves both individual and team sports, and
draws its thousands of competing athletes,
staff and stakeholders from a global pool:
potentially, 206 nations will gather for the
2020 Olympics (Parnell et al., 2020). As Ranney
(2021) writes, from a public health perspective,
the Olympics represent “a perfect storm for
infections like SARS-CoV-2 to spread, due to
the density of people attending, the close quar-
ters of athletes and the fact that people are
coming from all corners of the globe”. The com-
plications, related to finding or applying “one-
size-fits-all” solutions, are also impacted by
the national transmission rates, guidelines and
travelling restrictions which call for time rel-
evant and country- and event-specific
approaches to sporting event risk management
and organization.
The Playbook and Olympic test events
The Playbooks are part of a series, which aim to
provide a framework of basic principles that
each key stakeholder group will follow before
they travel to Japan, when entering Japan,
during their time at the Games and when
leaving the Games (IOC, 2020). The first of the
series was aimed at International Federations
and Technical Officials who must prepare for
in the region of 11,000 athletes. This was fol-
lowed by Playbooks for athletes, media and
broadcasters. The Playbooks provide direction
and set parameters that will enable stake-
holders to plan their operations and they will
be continually updated.
Sport governing bodies will typically release
policy documents and official communiqués
through their official channels to articulate
their requirements for host countries and
provide the public with updates. Previously,
Manuel Castells’ “relational power”, has been
used as to analyse the shift in responsibility
between key actors involved in the World Cup
2022. In this article, Millward (2017) illustrates
how those involved in allowing migrant con-
struction workers’ death, injury and illness
frame the situation as both “regrettable” but
also beyond its responsibility. For Leopkey
and Parent (2009b), the re-allocation strategy
involves the transfer of risk or the responsibility
of risk to somebody else. This raises questions
regarding what a “safe and successful” delivery
looks like and for whom. In this respect, the
transfer of responsibility to stakeholders away
from the IOC appears to be the strategy (ibid.).
Moreover, as Brynildsen and Parent (2021)
write, test events have – despite being subject
to limited research – traditionally held important
roles in the pre-planning of events, as risk man-
agement tools. Indeed, the IOC introduced
requirements related to test events in 1982
(ibid.). According to Tokyo 2020 (n.d.), the test
events are designated rehearsals that can
“confirm and improve the competition and
Games operation capabilities in order to ensure
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their successful operation during the Olympic
and Paralympic Games”. As according to the
test event calendar, the first test events of the
2020Olympicsbeganalready in September 2018.
Notwithstanding, it is currently clear that the
impacts of COVID-19 have significantly impacted
the test events’ meanings and objectives. As
recently found, test events’ objectives regularly
relate to showing readiness and the testing of
operationalization and the workforce (Brynildsen
& Parent, 2021). From February to May 2021,
ahead of the 2020 Olympics, a number of test
events were therefore scheduled for 18 athletic
disciplines in different venues including the
Ariake Gymnastics Centre and Tokyo Stadium
(Tokyo, 2020). As IOC (2020) stated following
the announcement of a revised test event calen-
dar in November 2020: “In response to the
COVID-19 situation, Tokyo 2020 will implement
infection control measures and plan to conduct
comprehensive tests of various aspects of
venue management, including taking care of
spectators at selected test events”. Thus,
whereas test events, in themselves, are not new-
found strategies adopted by organizing commit-
tees and/or event organizers, the pandemic has
clearly generated a novel context for test events
to be useful and telling risk management tools
within, and for the testing of COVID-19 related
countermeasures.
Furthermore, in reference to the discussed
risk management strategies (see Leopkey &
Parent, 2009b), this paper has tentatively ident-
ified strategies related to reduction (e.g.
reduced crowds, test events, “bubbles”,
testing, face masks), re-allocation (Playbooks,
“game plans”) and relationships (collaboration,
expert feedback, information-sharing) from
the emerging practice. To be sure, we acknowl-
edge that future empirical work should build
upon this and extend this further to encompass
the diverse risk management strategies, and
also reflect the wider literature on crisis and
sports management. Yet, in a way, this shows
the relevance and applicability of the frame-
work to the new and unique context.
Concluding comments and
considerations for future research
It is expected that 23 July 2021 will mark the
opening of the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo.
However, with less than three months to go,
uncertainties perpetuate regarding a potential
cancellation or another postponement. For
example, the mentioned suspension of over-
seas fans was, throughout April 2021, followed
by announced plans to test athletes on a daily
basis, a new state of emergency in Tokyo
(until 11 May 2021), and reports of the organi-
zers preparing for an event without spectators
(Sky Sports, 2021c). Meanwhile, “Cancelling
Olympics” has been trending on Twitter (Zirin
& Boykoff, 2021).
Notwithstanding, the Olympics are merely
one of several major sporting events that have
been rescheduled for the summer of 2021. To
conclude this article, we argue that this
Olympic version – similar to sporting events
more broadly – raises several critical questions.
As exemplified here by the 2020 Olympics,
rescheduled sporting events have undergone
significant organizational, social and spatial
redesign processes in the face of the pandemic.
This redesign is, in part, encapsulated by the
published Playbooks as well as the new riskman-
agement strategies and models that event orga-
nizers have had to consider, device and
implement. As the discussed sports events
staged throughout mid- and late 2020 and in
early 2021 reveal; risk, safety and health con-
cerns are likely to loom large at future sport
mega-events. However, as IOC (2021a, p. 10)
also acknowledge: “despite all care taken, risks
and impacts may not be fully eliminated, and
therefore you agree to attend the Olympic and
Paralympic Games at your own risk”. In this
sense, it should be reiterated that safety
related questions persist, and as Shimizu et al.
(2021, p. 1) call for, “[p]lans to hold the
Olympic and Paralympic games this summer
must be reconsidered as a matter of urgency”
and adhere to principles of public health.
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Recent sports competition and events have
demonstrated a need for new risk management
strategies to ensure social distancing and
testing to control transmission; flexible and
reactive approaches to emerging scenarios;
and the fostering of new relationships. More-
over, strategies such as the Olympic Playbooks
and test events are two specific pre-event risk
management strategies. With our discussion
of recent sporting events, linked with a concep-
tual discussion of risk management, this paper
contributes towards an understanding of the
emerging strategies and tools utilized by sport-
ing event organizers and stakeholder groups in
the mitigation of COVID-19 risks. Yet, it remains
clear that despite the new health, safety and
sanitation measures, widespread compliance
and phased reintroductions of spectators, com-
pletely “covid-secure” sporting events cannot
be guaranteed until this is achieved in the
wider society. As such, it may be prudent to
consider whether it is rightful to speak of
“covid-mitigated” rather than “covid-safe” (see
Urch & George, 2020) sporting events.
Finally, whereas researchers have started to
examine the diverse impacts of COVID-19 on
sports (see, for example, Constandt & Willem,
2021; Hindman et al., 2021; Parnell et al.,
2020; Perić et al., 2021), the medium and
long-term impacts will now start to take
effect. Therefore, we suggest that the oper-
ational advantages of test events warrant
further research as a sporting event risk man-
agement tool (Brynildsen & Parent, 2021).
Researchers could therefore investigate the
formal and informal modes (i.e. conventions,
workshops, policy documents) through which
experiences generated from test events –
before rescheduled sports events – were
shared and disseminated through networks of
expertise and consultation. We also encourage
researchers to explore how “game plans” (i.e.
the Playbooks) provided to athletes, staff,
media and other stakeholders are continually
revised, as new and updated versions become
available in line with rapid developments that
have characterized 2020 and 2021. We also
believe there is an opportunity for future
research that involves the investigation of sta-
keholders’ perspectives of risks related to
some of the mentioned, or other forthcoming
sporting events. Stakeholders, then, could
include organizing committees, sports federa-
tions, the media, sponsors and fan networks.
Importantly, such perspectives can add to the
existing knowledge (see Hanstad, 2012;
Leopkey & Parent, 2009a, 2009b).
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